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Abstract
In the so-called modern age, a transition can be observed in Western thought regarding this issue of 
tolerance. A perceptible shift can be seen in the understanding of tolerance as mere endurance to 
attempts to conceive of tolerance as a kind of well-grounded acceptance. It is regrettable, however, 
that this change in thinking has often remained hypothetical rather than heuristic.  This certainly has 
to do with the fact that most of the time only large-scale theological, philosophical, or political 
projects were negotiated. In this case, as is often happens, the directly concerned individual, the 
concrete person in the course of the demonstration efforts, was lost. We want to counter this loss with 
our study. In our investigation, which is based on a phenomenological reflection, we want to examine 
tolerance and respect as an existential problem couched within an individual. We wish to consider a 
person who desires to be tolerant and respectful; a person who accepts tolerance and respect as an 
existential task.
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Introduction
Centring one's exploration on a concrete 
person actively involved with the existential 
task of tolerance can be a counterweight to 
what we perceive as a significant historical 
1oversight,  a problem we argue that has not 
been sufficiently recognized as a problem. 
This quandary is: it remains unclear how one 
actually can truly tolerate – and not only 
endure – the one who thinks, believes, acts 
differently, without at the same time 
considering oneself as superior, silently 
subordinating the other to oneself or 
compromising one's own thinking, 
2believing, acting for the sake of the other.  
By locating our exploration within the 
framework of an individual facing the 
existential task of tolerance, we hope to first 
describe this quandary appropriately and 
then suggest a way towards heartfelt 
tolerance.
A Matter of the Heart
Let us consider a person who has a matter 
dear to their heart. They attempt to be true to 
this matter in all that they do. They dedicate 
themselves to this matter of the heart. They 
wish to be a person who embodies that which 
is necessary for the nurturing of this matter. 
Let us then consider that this person does not 
understand their matter of the heart as a 
thought, not as something which they have 
brought forth themselves, but rather as 
something that they have discovered. This 
discovery has had such a powerful effect on 
them that they have since wished to pour 
their heart into the matter, henceforth 
striving constantly to live in accordance with 
this discovery. 
1Independent Scholar, Berlin, Germany; 
Ewanlen: A Journal of Philosophical Inquiry
Vol. 1, No. 1, 2017: 10 – 16 
freterb@gmx.de
The discovery thus has a normative 
significance for our person: they have found 
an ought to which they have dedicated their 
existence. The reality of the discovery itself 
has forced them to do this. We wish to say 
that this person accepts their matter of the 
3heart as facticity.  When using the term 
facticity, we refer not to objective reality, to 
reality as it is in itself – we would indeed 
have no way of explaining what this might 
be –, but rather to that which somebody, in 
this case our hypothetical person, considers 
to be reality. When we attempt to describe, 
therefore, what it means to live under a 
certain facticity, we use the expression 
facticity not only ontologically, but at the 
same time hermeneutically as well. Reality 
and that which is considered to be reality 
coincide here. Our person hence considers 
their matter of the heart to be real. Based on 
the reality of this matter, they then determine 
the possibilities available for living their 
lives. These possibilities are thus 
determined in the wake of reality. Within the 
framework of facticity, of that which they 
consider to be real, the scope of available 
options opens up for our person to live their 
life. They see before them their spectrum of 
possibility.
It is this spectrum of possibility that we wish 
to call existentiality, and we refer to the 
practice within this spectrum as existential 
practice. While facticity thus refers to the 
assumption of reality, that which one 
considers to be reality, existentiality is to be 
understood as the practice of the realisation 
of possibilities, the positing of reality, the 
positing of – as we wish to put it – existential 
facts. We find ourselves situated in facticity 
and become existentially practical within 
this facticity. Through this existential 
practice, we narrow the available spectrum 
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of facticity. Perhaps our hypothetical person 
could have turned away from their 
discovery, but they did not wish to, and it is 
therefore no longer the case that everything 
is possible for them that had previously been 
possible. For they no longer wish to do that 
which runs contrary to the matter of the 
heart, so much so that they in fact no longer 
can do it; this person has thus posited an 
existential fact. Within our wider spectrum 
of possibility, therefore, we existentially 
define a narrower - and ever further 
narrowing – existential spectrum of 
possibility. It is through this narrowing of 
scope that we substantiate our existentiality 
and determine ourselves.
Two Matters of the Heart
Let us now consider a second person. This 
second person also has a matter dear to their 
heart, and they, too, understand their matter 
of the heart as a discovery in reality. We do 
not at this stage wish to define what their 
respective matters of the heart are, but let us 
simply assume that they are deeply 
contradictory to one another: the first 
person's matter of the heart can only be 
reality if that of the second person is not, and 
the second person's matter of the heart can 
only be reality if that of the first person is not.
Let us then consider that these two people 
cross paths. They soon notice the other's 
matter of the heart and must recognise that 
each person's matter is opposed to that of the 
other. If one is real, then the other cannot be 
real. Our two hypothetical people cannot 
agree upon facticity. And, as happens when 
people live alongside one another, the one 
person's matter of the heart will eventually 
demand that which the other person's 
forbids, and vice versa. In addition to the 
respective facticities, the two existentialities 
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now also stand in confrontation with one 
another.
The Existential Problem
Even just a quick glance at human history 
will suffice to conclude that in this moment 
of confrontation, we have frequently 
attempted to enforce our own point of view 
through the use of violence. But we do not 
wish to broach this issue here. This moment, 
when two (or more) matters of the heart 
stand in opposition to one another, does 
namely not necessarily bring forth violence. 
For the person who – for whatever reason – 
does not wish to condemn, to oppress, to 
corrupt the other, this moment results in 
deep existential perplexity: »What should I 
undertake«, our two hypothetical people 
may now ask themselves, »so as not to 
condemn the other, although they live 
contrary to my matter of the heart? And if I 
manage to live with their matter of the heart, 
will I not thus condemn my own matter of 
4the heart?
But our two protagonists would indeed have 
felt uneasy long before the moment of 
existential conflict. It was already a strange 
constellation to consider one's own matter of 
the heart to be of all-encompassing 
importance while simply putting up with, 
simply enduring that of the other. »Is it 
appropriate«, one could ask well before the 
respective facticities and existentialities 
come into direct conflict, »merely to put up 
with, merely to endure the other's matter of 
the heart? Would it not be desirable to be able 
to accept the other and that which is their 
own, and not just acknowledge their 
presence?«
These are the moments, be they of the former 
or of the latter variety, in which the concept 
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of tolerance enters our lives as a problem, as 
a task. And, as the former situation in 
particular demonstrates, this task involves 
us going beyond the version of tolerance 
which merely consists of the mistrustful 
endurance of the other. Johann Wolfgang 
von Goethe summed it up in wonderfully 
laconic fashion in his Maxims and 
Reflections: »Toleration«, he writes, 
»should, strictly speaking, be only a passing 
mood; it ought to lead to acknowledgment 
and appreciation. To tolerate a person is to 
5affront him.  An interest in respect, 
therefore, which goes beyond the mere 
endurance of the presence of the other, is the 
true object of our investigation.
The Political Intention
It seems of importance to us to delve more 
deeply into the existential origins of this 
interest in respect. The rampant populism of 
our current political climate – e.g. in Europe 
from the Alternative für Deutschlandin 
Germany to the Front Nationalin France and 
Chrysi Avgiin Greece – attempts, along with 
a number of other turpitudes, to portray this 
existential interest as contemptible by 
repeatedly claiming that one's own cultural 
sphere should not be burdened by another. In 
other words: the populists of our time wish, 
primarily through their neo-nationalism, on 
the one hand to make the necessity of respect 
for the other superfluous by ensuring that 
this other, this foreign element, remains in its 
own – foreign – country, while on the other 
hand attempting to align people – usually 
those who, in the eyes of the respective party, 
are the legitimate members of a certain 
nation – with a narrow conservative canon of 
norms based exclusively on the recognition 
of their own cultural sphere.
It is for this reason that it seems to us to be of 
Ewanlen: A Journal of Philosophical Inquiry
such great importance to clarify how those 
who wish to respect the matters dear to the 
hearts of others can in fact realise this 
respect. Our aim here is thus not the 
conversion of intolerant people, but rather to 
p r o v i d e  a  s o l i d  p h i l o s o p h i c a l -
phenomenological basis for the existential 
practice of the actively respectful person.
Material Difference in Facticity
Let us return to our two hypothetical people 
and define their matters of the heart more 
precisely. Let us say that one is of Muslim 
6faith and the other of Christian faith.  Their 
discovery within reality is their God. It is 
him to whom they have dedicated 
themselves. He is the normative facticity. 
Their founding scriptures of facticity are, 
respectively, the Koran and the text corpus 
consisting of the Hebrew Bible and the New 
Testament. In the Koran and especially in the 
New Testament ,  Jesus is of great 
significance. However, who this Jesus was 
and what tasks were assigned to him within 
the normative facticity are questions that are 
answered very differently in the two texts. 
While in the New Testament, the crucifixion 
of Jesus constitutes the absolute centrepiece 
of the narrative, according to the Koran 
(Sure 4, 157), this crucifixion never even
7took place.
Which of these versions of events is true 
then? Which story of Jesus is the real story? 
Here, there can be no agreement. A 
discussion of this question can hardly end 
with one participant conceding ground to the 
other. Furthermore, it is impossible for one 
person to admit that the other is correct 
without giving up their own matter of the 
heart. It is impossible for an outside observer 
to determine the primacy of one facticity 
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over the other in a quasi objective manner, 
just as it is impossible to create any kind of 
harmony between the two facticities which 
would make it possible for both people to 
a c c e p t  b o t h  v e r s i o n s  o f  J e s u s  
simultaneously. Correspondingly, there will 
also be existential differences. The 
existential spectrum of possible action will 
inevitably be different depending on 
whether Jesus is understood in his facticity 
as being one of many prophets or the one and 
only messiah.
This vexing situation is certainly a 
peculiarity of inter-religious dialogue: there 
can be no material compromise, since the 
knowledge in question has not been attained 
by, but rather bestowed upon mankind – for 
example through revelation. And somebody 
who believes the one revelation cannot 
believe the other. Even if the two revelations 
were to contain the same information, we 
would still be unable to grasp this fact, since 
mankind can only understand that which 
God has chosen to reveal – and even that 
only to a very limited extent.   It seems to us 
to be entirely futile to attempt, as is 
repeatedly the case with so-called inter-
religious dialogue, to emphasise the many 
common elements of Islam and Christianity, 
for example. While these common elements 
certainly do exist and are certainly 
fascinating, pointing them out is of no 
assistance when we are faced with such 
fundamental differences as can be found in 
the perception of the man Jesus. We should 
take these differences seriously. A Muslim 
and a Christian person live in respective 
facticities which cannot be fully reconciled 
with one another.
Moreover, it would be extremely strange if 
an inter-religious dialogue were only 
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possible or meaningful between religious 
facticities which were similar to one another. 
This would drastically restrict the 
possibilities for such a discussion. Should a 
Christian and a Sikh not be able to conduct a 
meaningful discussion? Or even a Christian, 
a Sikh and an atheist?  
We therefore assume that a discussion on the 
level of facticity is not of direct relevance for 
the question of mutual recognition and 
respect. The material difference between 
Muslim and Christian facticity, for example, 
can be neither denied nor discussed with the 
goal of harmonisation. This material 
difference in facticity can only, to put it in 
extreme terms here, be presented for the 
purposes of reciprocal acknowledgement.
Formal Identity of Existentiality
However, when we think back to the interest 
of our Moslem and our Christian, is this 
material difference of any significance at all 
for the problem of respect? Does the 
question of whether I can respect the other 
actually concern the material of facticity? 
The material difference in facticity and 
hence the differences in existential practice 
are surely the origin of the question of 
whether or not one can respect the other. It is 
only through the material differences that 
this question becomes necessary in the first 
place. This does not mean, however, that 
mutual respect is only possible through the 
removal, however that may be achieved, of 
these differences.
We wish to propose that for the question of 
how one can respect one's own matter of the 
heart and that of another simultaneously, it is 
not the material difference in facticity that is 
of primary importance, but rather the formal 
identity of existentiality. Here, we find 
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precisely that which we can respect in the 
other, enabling us to respect them without 
condemning ourselves in that moment.
Starting from our facticity, our hermeneutics 
of reality, we form our existentiality. If I then 
wish to respect another who claims to be 
subject to a different facticity, and thus 
becomes existentially practical in a different 
way, I can shift my focus from the material to 
the form of their existentiality: I can respect 
another by attempting to take them seriously 
in their existential practice, despite the fact 
that this practice may differ from mine in 
terms of its content. I can attempt to reflect 
on the fact that the other person has also 
dedicated themselves with earnestness to 
their matter of the heart. And this 
earnestness, this form of existential practice, 
can indeed be the same as the earnestness 
with which I approach my matter of the 
heart. This formal identity of earnestness 
should, in our opinion, be the focus of 
attention when working on the problem of 
respect, and not, as we have explained, the 
material difference. To transform this 
difference into identity would mean to 
practise respect by enforcing uniformity. 
What is necessary is to take the difference 
seriously as a difference and to reflect not on 
the difference itself, but instead on the 
identity of the existential effort on both 
sides. While one person may believe one 
thing and another may believe another, I can 
take them seriously in their belief, even if I 
consider it to be incorrect in its facticity, if 
they are existentially practical with 
earnestness. I can respect them in this 
earnestness while at the same time admitting 
differences in facticity, without condemning 
myself in doing so.
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Working Towards Earnestness
When we speak of the formal identity of 
existentiality, we thus mean on the one hand 
– almost on an anthropological level – that 
we humans become existentially practical in 
general, and on the other hand the 
earnestness with which one person becomes 
existentially practical. To take somebody 
else seriously means, in our context, to 
recognise and respect the matter of the heart 
as a matter of the heart, to recognise and 
respect that which is important to them as 
something that is important. For this to 
occur, it is not necessary to share the material 
of that which is important. When we take 
somebody else seriously, we recognise and 
respect that something is dear to their heart, 
and not what is dear to their heart.
We find the primal scene of this recognition 
and respect in the love of parents for their 
child: the child may do whatever it likes, 
including things that the parents may find 
entirely misguided. We understand 
immediately though why parents can 
nevertheless respect their child: it is the 
earnestness of the child in its actions that is 
of primary importance, and only after that 
the actions themselves.
And it is equally directly understandable that 
parents love their own children without ever, 
in the course of exercising this love, 
questioning the – formally identical – love of 
other parents for their respective children. 
This love occurs formally again and again, 
although the material of this love is quasi 
unique in each case. The ability to take 
somebody else seriously is something that I 
must work to attain. In order to make this 
possible, inter-religious discussion is 
necessary. This discussion, however, is too 
often held up by helplessness or ignorance in 
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the face of material differences between 
religious normative facticities. We should 
reflect upon the necessity to respect each 
other in a formal-existential sense, meaning 
to take each other seriously. We can learn 
about the existentiality of the other in the 
course of interaction, and indeed only in this 
way. In doing so, we can experience and 
respect the other as another's own.
Let us consider one last time our Muslim and 
our Christian, applying our deliberations as 
we do so: the Christian who believes in the 
Bible does not have to disrespect the Muslim 
who believes in the Koran. While the 
Christian cannot materially respect the 
Muslim's grasp of existence, the former can 
nevertheless take the Islamic grasp of 
existence seriously in its existentiality, and 
thus respect it. The Christian and the Muslim 
can respect each other despite the material 
differences because they can take the 
formally identical existentiality of the other 
seriously without thereby betraying 
themselves. 
Conclusion
We have attempted the return the problem of 
tolerance to its existential core. We have 
tried to argue for the dignity of the matter of 
the heart and to explore how it might be 
possible to commit oneself to one's matter of 
the heart without the annulment of another.  
We did not focus our concern on the 
conversion of an oppressor, rather we 
addressed the dilemma of a person who 
sincerely does not know how to deal with 
two competing matters of the heart. This 
problem, becomes manageable as soon as 
we understand that it is simply not the 
material difference in facticity that is of 
primary importance, but rather the formal 
identity of existentiality. A person may 
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believe something else than I, I can still take 
them seriously in the existentiality of their 
belief, even if I assume that they are wrong 
in its facticity. It was important to us in this 
modest phenomenological study to bring 
philosophy into the immediacy and intimacy 
of an individual person and their crucial 
question: »I want to accept my neighbor, but 
how can I do that?«. We conclude that 
philosophy as a discipline must give greater 
consideration to these exigent, lived 
questions.
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